Fourth Opinion – The Heretical Pope
Loses the Pontificate Only After the Intervention
of a Declarative Act of His Heresy
Main Source: The masterful work “La Nouvelle Messe de Paul VI : qu’en penser ?”
by Professor Arnaldo Vidigal Xavier da Silveira, theologian of Campos, Brazil.
According to this fourth opinion, the Pope never loses the Pontificate by the sole fact of his fall into heresy. Rather, for his destitution to be effective, it is necessary that there be a declarative act of his defection in the faith. As is evident, such a declaration cannot be a juridical decision in the strict sense, since there exists on earth no superior of the Roman Pontiff who can judge him. But it will be a simple non-juridical declaration, by reason of which Jesus Christ Himself immediately withdraws the Pontificate from him.
The principal defenders of this fourth opinion are Cajetan and Suarez.
- Defense of this opinion by Suarez
After having refuted the opinion according to which the heretical Pope is automatically “deposed”, Suarez defends his position in the following terms:
“(…) in no case, even that of heresy, is the Pontiff deprived of his dignity and his power immediately by God Himself, before the judgment and sentence of men. This is the common opinion today: Cajetan (de Auctoritate Papae, c. 18 and 19); Soto (4, d. 22, quaest. 2, art. 2); Cano (4 de Locis, c. ult. ad 12); Corduba (lib. 4, q. 11). Later, when treating of the penalties of heretics, we shall indicate yet other authors, and we shall show in general that, by divine law, no one is deprived of his dignity and his ecclesiastical jurisdiction because of the crime of heresy. We now give an a priori argument: given that such a destitution is one of the gravest penalties, one would incur it ipso facto only if it were expressed in the divine law; now, we find no law that establishes it, neither in general concerning heretics, nor in particular concerning bishops, nor in a very particular manner concerning the Pope. Nor does there exist any certain Tradition on this question. The Pope cannot lose his dignity ipso facto either by virtue of a human law, for such a law would have to be established by an inferior, that is, by a Council, or by an equal, that is, by a previous Pope; but neither a Council nor a previous Pope possesses such coercive power that they can punish their equal or their superior. Therefore, etc.
(…) You will say that there could be a law interpreting the divine law. But this would be without foundation, for you cite no divine law of this kind; moreover, up to the present, no Council nor any Pope has established a law that would have interpreted such a divine law.
This is confirmed by the fact that such a law would be harmful to the Church; one could therefore in no case believe that it was instituted by Christ; what precedes is proved: if the Pope were an occult heretic, and for this reason had lost his office ipso facto, all his acts would be invalid.
You will say that this argument proves nothing concerning a notorious and public heretic. But this is not true, for if the external but occult heretic can still be the true Pope, he can likewise continue to be so in the case where the offense becomes known, as long as no sentence has been pronounced against him. And this, both because no one suffers a penalty except ipso facto or by a sentence and because this would entail still greater evils. Indeed, there would be a doubt about the degree of infamy necessary for him to lose his office; schisms would result from this, and everything would become uncertain, especially if, after having become known as a heretic, the Pope maintained his office by force or by other means, and exercised numerous acts of his office.
A second confirmation, which is of great importance: in the case where the heresy of the Pope became external, but occult, and then he repented sincerely, he would be placed in a situation of total perplexity: if he has lost his office because of heresy, he would have to absolutely abandon the pontificate, which is extremely grave and almost contrary to natural law, for this would amount to denouncing himself; but he could not conserve the episcopate either, for that would be intrinsically evil. This being so, even the defenders of the contrary opinion confess that in this case it would be licit for him to conserve the episcopate, and that he would therefore be the true Pope; this is the common opinion of the canonists, and that of the Glossa (c. Nunc autem, d. 21). From this one infers an evident argument against them, for, given that the pontifical office is not restored by God through penance, as grace is, it is unheard of that one who is not the true Pope should be made Pope by God without election and the ministry of men.
Finally, faith is not absolutely necessary for a man to be capable of spiritual and ecclesiastical jurisdiction and to be able to exercise true acts that require this jurisdiction; therefore, etc. What precedes is evident, given that, as the treatises on penance and censures teach, in a case of extreme necessity, a heretical priest can absolve, which is not possible without jurisdiction.
(…) The heretical Pope is not a member of the Church as regards the substance and form that constitute the members of the Church; but he is the head as regards the office and the action; and this is not surprising, for he is not the first and principal head who acts by his own power, but he is in a certain way instrumental, he is the vicar of the principal head, who can exercise his spiritual action on the members even through a head of bronze; analogically, he sometimes baptizes through heretics, sometimes absolves, etc., as we have already said.
(…) I affirm: If he is a heretic and incorrigible, the Pope ceases to be Pope as soon as a declaratory sentence of his crime is pronounced against him by the legitimate jurisdiction of the Church. This is the teaching commonly held by the doctors, and it is deduced from the first epistle of Saint Clement I, in which one reads that Saint Peter taught that the heretical Pope must be deposed. The reason is the following: It would be extremely harmful to the Church to have such a pastor and not to be able to defend itself in so grave a danger; moreover, it would be contrary to the dignity of the Church to oblige it to remain subject to a heretical Pontiff without being able to expel him; for such is the priest, such is the people; this is confirmed by the reasons alleged in favor of the preceding opinion (that of ipso facto deposition), especially the one that says that heresy “spreads like a cancer”, for which reason heretics must be avoided as soon as possible, and therefore much more the heretical pastor; but how can he be avoided if he does not cease to be pastor?
Editorial note:
This argumentation nevertheless seems to involve a difficulty. If the publicly heretical Pontiff really conserves jurisdiction until a declaration by the Church, it follows precisely that a man separated from the Church can continue to govern this same Church juridically during all the time necessary for the assembly of this assembly and the issuance of its declaration. Such a consequence seems hardly reconcilable with the very end of ecclesiastical authority, which is to conserve the unity of the faith and to protect the faithful against errors, rather than to permit that a publicly heretical head continue to exercise the government of the Church.
(…) Concerning this conclusion, some explanations must be given.
In the first place, who should pronounce such a sentence? Some say the Cardinals; and the Church could doubtless attribute this faculty to them, especially if it were established by the consent and determination of the Sovereign Pontiffs, as has been done for the election. But up to the present we do not read anywhere that such a judgment has been entrusted to them. Consequently, one must say that, by right, it belongs to all the Bishops of the Church. For, being ordinary pastors and columns of the Church, this major cause must be considered to belong to them, and since by human right nothing is established on the matter, one must necessarily hold that the cause refers to all, and even to the general Council. This is the common opinion of the doctors. One can see that Cardinal Albano exposes this point at length (“De Cardinalibus”, q.35 – edition of 1584, tom.13, p.2).
Second doubt: how could such a Council legitimately assemble, since it is for the Pope to convoke it legitimately? One answers, in the first place, that perhaps a proper general Council would not be necessary, but it would suffice that in each region provincial or national Councils be convoked by the Archbishops or Primates, and that all arrive at the same conclusion. In the second place, if a general Council is convoked to define things of faith or to promulgate universal laws, it is legitimate only if it is convoked by the Pope; but if it is convoked to treat of the matter of which we speak, which concerns specially the Pontiff himself and is in a certain way contrary to him, the Council can be legitimately convoked either by the College of Cardinals, or by agreement among the Bishops; and if the Pontiff attempts to prevent such an assembly, one must not obey him, for, acting against justice and the common good, he would abuse his supreme power.
(…) From this arises the third doubt: by what right could the Pope be judged by this assembly, since it is inferior to him? On this point Cajetan strives extraordinarily in order not to be forced to admit that the Church or the Council is above the Pope in case of heresy; he concludes finally that they are above the Pope, not as Pope, but as a private person. This distinction, however, does not satisfy, for by the same argument one could say that the Church is head to judge and punish the Pope, not as Pope, but as a private person (…).
Others affirm that, in case of heresy, the Church is superior to the Pope. But this is difficult to admit, for Christ constituted the Pope as absolutely supreme judge; the canons also affirm this principle in general without distinctions; and, finally, the Church cannot exercise any act of jurisdiction over the Pope, and in electing him it does not confer power on him but designates the person to whom Christ directly confers the power.
Consequently, in deposing a heretical Pope, the Church would not act as superior to him, but juridically, and by the consent of Christ, it would declare him heretical and therefore absolutely unworthy of the pontifical honors; he would then be ipso facto and immediately deposed by Christ, and once deposed he would become inferior and could be punished.
Editorial note:
This construction nevertheless raises a major difficulty. It seems to introduce, between the crime of heresy and the loss of the Pontificate, an extrinsic condition. Now Suarez himself affirms that he finds no law establishing this condition and that there exists no certain Tradition on this question. If this is the case, on what positive foundation does the necessity of a prior declaration rest before Christ withdraws the pontifical jurisdiction?
- Refutation of this opinion by Saint Robert Bellarmine
Saint Robert Bellarmine, who did not approve this fourth opinion, refutes it thus:
“The fourth opinion is that of Cajetan, according to whom (de auctor. papae et conc., cap. 20 and 21) the manifestly heretical Pope is not ipso facto deposed, but can and must be deposed by the Church. In my judgment, this opinion cannot be defended. For, in the first place, it is proved by arguments of authority and of reason that the manifest heretic is ipso facto deposed. The argument of authority is founded on Saint Paul (Epistle to Titus, 3), who orders that the heretic be avoided after two admonitions, that is, after having shown himself manifestly obstinate – which means before any excommunication or judicial sentence. And this is what Saint Jerome writes, adding that other sinners are excluded from the Church by sentence of excommunication, but that heretics exile themselves and separate themselves from the body of Christ. Now, a Pope who remains Pope cannot be avoided, for how could we be obliged to avoid our own head? How can we separate ourselves from a member united to us? This principle is very certain. The non-Christian cannot in any way be Pope, as Cajetan himself admits (ibidem, cap. 26). The reason is that he cannot be the head of that of which he is not a member; now he who is not a Christian is not a member of the Church, and a manifest heretic is not a Christian, as Saint Cyprian (lib. 4, epist. 2), Saint Athanasius (Ser. 2 cont. Arian.), Saint Augustine (lib. de grat. Christ. cap. 20), Saint Jerome (cont. Lucifer.) and others clearly teach; therefore the manifest heretic cannot be Pope.
To this Cajetan answers (in Apol. pro tract. Praedicto cap. 25 and in ipso tract. cap. 22) that the heretic is not a Christian simpliciter, but is one secundum quid. For, given that two things constitute the Christian – faith and the character –, the heretic, having lost the faith, is still in a certain manner united to the Church and capable of jurisdiction; therefore, he is also Pope, but he must be removed, since he is disposed, with an ultimate disposition, to cease being Pope; like the man who is not yet dead but is in extremis.
Against this; in the first place, if the heretic, by virtue of the character, remained in act united to the Church, he could never be cut off or separated in act from it, for the character is indelible. But there is no one who denies that certain persons can be separated in act from the Church. Therefore, the character does not make the heretic be in act in the Church, but is only a sign that he was there and that he must return there. Analogically, when the sheep wanders lost in the mountains, the mark imprinted on it does not make it be in the fold, but indicates from which fold it has fled and toward which fold it must be brought back. This truth has a confirmation in Saint Thomas who says (Summa Th. III, 8, 3) that those who do not have the faith are not united in act to Christ, but only potentially – and Saint Thomas speaks here of the internal union, and not of the external union produced by the confession of faith and the visible signs. Therefore, as the character is something internal, and not external, according to Saint Thomas the character alone does not unite a man in act to Christ.
Moreover against the argument of Cajetan; either faith is a disposition necessary simpliciter for someone to be Pope, or else it is necessary only to be Pope in a more perfect manner (ad bene esse). In the first hypothesis, in the case where this disposition is eliminated by the contrary disposition, which is heresy, the Pope immediately ceases to be Pope; for the form cannot maintain itself without the necessary dispositions. In the second hypothesis, the Pope cannot be deposed for reason of heresy, for otherwise he would also have to be deposed for ignorance, improbity, and other similar causes, which prevent science, probity and the other dispositions necessary for him to be Pope in a more perfect manner (ad bene esse papae). Moreover, Cajetan recognizes (tract. praed., ca. 26) that the Pope cannot be deposed for the lack of dispositions necessary, not simpliciter, but only for a greater perfection (ad bene esse).
To this, Cajetan answers that faith is a disposition necessary simpliciter, but partial, and not total; and that, therefore, faith disappearing, the Pope can still continue to be Pope, by reason of the other part of the disposition, which is the character, which still persists.
Against this argument: either the total disposition, constituted by the character and by faith, is necessary simpliciter, or else it is not, the partial disposition then being sufficient. In the first hypothesis, faith disappearing, the disposition necessary simpliciter no longer remains, for the disposition necessary simpliciter was the total one, and the total one no longer exists. In the second hypothesis, faith is necessary only for a more perfect manner of being (ad bene esse), and therefore its absence does not justify the deposition of the Pope. Moreover, what is found in the ultimate disposition to death ceases immediately to exist by the following, without the intervention of any other external force, as is evident; therefore, also the heretical Pope ceases to be Pope by himself, without any deposition.
Finally, the Holy Fathers all teach not only that heretics are outside the Church, but also that they are ipso facto deprived of all ecclesiastical jurisdiction and dignity. Saint Cyprian (lib. 2, epist. 6) says: “we affirm that absolutely all heretics and schismatics have no power nor right”; and he also teaches (lib. 2, epist. 1) that heretics who return to the Church must be received as laymen, even if they had previously been priests or bishops in the Church. Saint Optatus (lib. 1 cont. Parmen.) teaches that heretics and schismatics cannot have the keys of the kingdom of heaven, nor bind nor loose. The same is taught by Saint Ambrose (lib. 1 de poenit., cap. 2), Saint Augustine (in Enchir., cap. 65), Saint Jerome (lib. cont. Lucifer.) (…).
Pope Saint Celestine I (epist. ad Jo. Antioch., which figures in the Council of Ephesus, tom. I, cap. 19) wrote: “It is evident that he has remained and remains in our communion, and we do not consider deposed, him who has been excommunicated or deprived of office, whether episcopal or clerical, by Bishop Nestorius or by others who follow him, after these have begun to preach heresy. For the sentence of him who has already revealed himself as one who must be deposed cannot depose anyone.”
And in a letter to the clergy of Constantinople, Pope Saint Celestine I says: “The authority of our Apostolic See has determined that the bishop, cleric or simple Christian who has been deposed or excommunicated by Nestorius or his partisans, after these have begun to preach heresy, must not be considered as deposed or excommunicated. For he who with such preachings has failed in the faith cannot depose or remove anyone.”
The same is repeated and confirmed by Saint Nicholas I (Epist. ad Michael). Finally, Saint Thomas also teaches (S. Theol., II-II, 39, 3) that schismatics immediately lose all jurisdiction, and that what they attempt to do on the basis of some jurisdiction will be null.
There is no foundation to what some answer to this: that these Fathers base themselves on the ancient law, whereas at present, by the decree of the Council of Constance, only those lose jurisdiction who are nominally excommunicated and those who assault clerics. This argument – I say – has no value, for these Fathers, affirming that heretics lose jurisdiction, allege no human right, which perhaps did not exist on the matter at that time, but argue on the basis of the very nature of heresy. The Council of Constance treats only of the excommunicated, that is, of those who lose jurisdiction by sentence of the Church, whereas heretics already before being excommunicated are outside the Church and deprived of all jurisdiction. For they have already been condemned by their own sentence, as the Apostle teaches (Tit. 3,10-11), that is, they have been cut off from the body of the Church without excommunication, as Saint Jerome explains.
Moreover, the second assertion of Cajetan, that the heretical Pope can be truly and authoritatively deposed by the Church, is no less false than the first. For if the Church deposes the Pope against his will, it is certainly above the Pope; yet Cajetan himself defends, in the same treatise, the contrary of this. Cajetan answers that the Church, in deposing the Pope, does not have authority over the Pope, but only over the bond that unites the person to the Pontificate. In the same way that the Church, in uniting the Pontificate to such a person, is not for that reason above the Pontiff, so the Church can separate the Pontificate from such a person in case of heresy, without saying that it is above the Pontiff.
But against this one must observe in the first place that, from the fact that the Pope deposes Bishops, one deduces that the Pope is above all Bishops, although the Pope in deposing a Bishop does not destroy episcopal jurisdiction, but only separates it from that person. In the second place, to depose someone from the Pontificate against the will of the deposed is doubtless a penalty; therefore, the Church, in deposing a Pope against his will, doubtless punishes him; now, to punish is proper to a superior or judge. In the third place, given that, according to Cajetan and the other Thomists, in reality the whole and the parts taken together are the same thing, he who has authority over the parts taken together, being able to separate them from one another, also has authority over the whole properly constituted by these parts.
And the example of the electors given by Cajetan is worth nothing, who have the power to designate a certain person for the Pontificate, without however having power over the Pope. For, when something is in the process of being done, the action is exercised on the matter of the future thing, and not on the composite, as becomes patent in the consideration of things of nature. Consequently, in creating the Pontiff, the Cardinals do not exercise their authority over the Pontiff, for the latter does not yet exist, but on the matter, that is, on the person who by the election becomes disposed to receive the Pontificate from God. But if they deposed the Pontiff, they would necessarily exercise authority over the composite, that is, over the person endowed with pontifical power, that is, over the Pontiff.
Notes
(1) This fourth opinion is therefore absolutely not the same as conciliarism – a theory condemned as heretical according to which the Council would be superior to the Pope, being capable of judging him and deposing him.
(2) Suarez is a partisan of the first opinion, defending this fourth only in the hypothesis – which he judges less probable – that the Pontiff can fall into heresy. Cajetan, on the contrary, positively admits the possibility of the defection of the Pope in the faith.
(3) The term “deposition” is used here in the classical theological sense of loss of the pontificate.
(4) This affirmation of Suarez does not seem founded. Saint Paul (Tit. 3,10) and Saint John (II Jn 10-11) command to avoid the heretic.
(5) The dilemma presented by Suarez is valid, but he does not perceive that according to the fifth opinion there is a complex fact entailing automatic loss.
(6) The fifth opinion is the one to which Saint Robert Bellarmine adheres.
(7) Today this thesis does not sound so bad to the ears of many theologians. Saint Alphonsus Liguori admits in principle such an eventuality.
(8) See the observations on the incompatibility in root, but not absolute, between heresy and ecclesiastical jurisdiction.
(9) Here is found the principal objection that can be raised against this fourth opinion.
(10) Here is the central point – and which seems weak to us – of Suarez’s argumentation.
(11) One must not confuse the ipso facto deposition of the fifth opinion with that to which Suarez refers here.
(12) Suarez, De Fide, disp. X, sect. VI, nn. 3-10, pp. 316-318.
(13) In the text cited below, Saint Robert Bellarmine presents and refutes the principal reasons alleged by Cajetan.
(14) We recall that the term “deposition” is used by Saint Robert Bellarmine in the generic sense of the loss of the pontificate.
(15) According to the current Canon Law in force (1917), there is no latae sententiae deposition; consequently heretical bishops and priests continue to occupy their offices… Does this determination contradict the principles exposed by Saint Robert Bellarmine? In part yes… we verify that the affirmations of Saint Robert Bellarmine remain entirely defensible provided they are nuanced on these two points.
(16) Saint Robert Bellarmine, De Rom. Pont., lib. II, cap. 30, pp. 418-420.